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The Reasonable Woman and the "Warrior Code"
by Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man
Caroline A. Forell & Donna M. Matthews
New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000
In this provocative book, Professor Caroline Forell and Ms. Donna Matthews (an Oregon
lawyer) argue that existing law systematically undervalues women's experiences of
sexual harassment and sexual violence. In essence, the authors contend that law is a
"warrior code" that is unduly forgiving of sexual aggression and violence, and they
support this contention by showing how "male-centered values" permeate the law of
sexual harassment, stalking, domestic violence, and rape. This critique alone would make
this work worthy of serious consideration by anyone concerned with the law's treatment
of women.
"Male" vs. "Female"
The authors argue that both the traditional "reasonable man" standard and the more
modern "reasonable person" standard allow decision-makers to apply male-defined
community norms to assess sexual harassment of, and sexual violence against, women.
That claim is most persuasive when, as in the case of domestic homicides, the authors
support their argument not only with case law analysis and newspaper accounts but with
social science research and statistics showing the differential treatment women
defendants receive in such cases. The authors use that combined data to indict the
criminal justice system's treatment of men who kill their intimates and of battered women
who kill in self-defense.
The authors are on weaker footing, however, when relying predominantly on case
analysis, as they do in their discussion of hostile environment sexual harassment law.
They tend to conclude their discussions of cases with which they disagree by saying that
the judges decided them from a "male perspective." For example, they find the Supreme
Court's sexual harassment decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) to be
"directly attributable to the presence of two women on the Supreme Court." But this is
mere labeling, not analysis. Moreover, it creates problems for the authors when cases
with which they disagree are decided by female judges; in these cases, they are forced to
argue that the female judges applied male standards in evaluating the harassing conduct.
Although it is fair to suggest that a judge may not have considered all the relevant factors
in a case (including those factors that are critical to women's experiences in the
workplace), it is perhaps simplistic to argue that the result stems from the judge's
applying a male perspective. This does not, however, undercut the book's value in
illuminating the types of considerations that can and should influence the finding of a
hostile work environment under sexual harassment law.

The "Reasonable Woman": A New Legal Benchmark for All?
The most interesting part of the book is its proposed remedy for existing imbalances in
the law. Like some other commentators, Forell and Matthews advocate the use of a
reasonable woman standard in cases that predominantly affect women. Unlike other
commentators, however, the authors advocate applying the reasonable woman standard to
the conduct of men as well as women. Thus, for example, the relevant standard in a rape
case would be "whether, in the same circumstances, a reasonable woman would have
believed consent existed." In a domestic homicide, the relevant question would be
whether a reasonable woman would have killed her spouse or lover under the
circumstances. Defining the minimum standard of socially acceptable conduct by
reference to the reasonable woman is preferable as a policy matter, the authors argue,
because it would enhance the law's respect for bodily integrity, agency, and autonomy –
values that get short shrift under male-based legal standards.
Thus, the authors forcefully argue that the reasonable woman standard should be used to
evaluate both men's and women's conduct. At first, this proposal sounds counterintuitive.
Even if existing law judges female conduct in accordance with male norms, it is not
initially obvious that the solution for this problem should be to judge male conduct by
female norms. Yet the authors convincingly argue that a dramatic paradigm shift is
necessary to eliminate the bias in existing law.
Of course, the authors' contention raises both pragmatic and philosophical questions
about the operation of the reasonable woman standard. Is a simple shift in verbal
formulas, from a "reasonable person" standard to a "reasonable woman" standard,
sufficient to eliminate any underlying gender bias by decision-makers? The authors
convincingly show that the shift from a "reasonable man" standard to a "reasonable
person" standard only marginally ameliorated the application of male-based norms.
Further, the authors acknowledge that care must be taken lest decision-makers transform
the "reasonable woman" into a reasonable man in disguise or base judgments on sexist
stereotypes. But they fail to define the reasonable woman standard other than to urge that
it would enhance respect for female-based norms of bodily integrity, agency, and
autonomy.
The authors acknowledge that the standard must be accompanied by a "careful
explanation of what the standard means," and they further suggest that the explanation
would take the form of expert testimony and carefully worded jury instructions.
Nonetheless, their argument would have been stronger had they chosen to provide more
concrete examples of exactly what types of expert testimony would be admissible and the
exact wording of proper jury instructions. That also would allow direct comparison of the
proposed reasonable woman standard with other alternatives – whether, for example, it is
better to judge all defendants in domestic homicide cases by the reasonable woman
standard (even if the defendant is a man) or whether it is more effective to declare certain
"provocations," such as discovery of one's partner committing adultery, insufficient as a
matter of law to reduce first-degree murder to manslaughter. But perhaps this is a

lawyer's quibble with a book that is, after all, designed to reach a broader audience than
simply law professors and practitioners.
Fumbling Towards Gender Equality
The underlying assumption of A Law of Her Own is that changing to a "reasonable
woman" standard will alter social norms about sex and violence. The authors suggest that
application of the reasonable woman standard across the board will not only increase
empathy for both male and female victims of harassment, stalking, and violence; rather, it
will also "re-educate" a certain portion of men about what behavior is expected and help
achieve "true equality of the sexes."
This is a bold claim, one that warrants at least some philosophical exploration of the role
of law in shaping social norms, especially since some decision-makers are likely to view
the application of a reasonable woman standard to the conduct of men as fundamentally
unfair. A Law of Her Own is nonetheless an important book, and the authors' proposals
merit sustained consideration by anyone who cares about gender equality.
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